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Abstract. The networks of compromised and remotely controlled computers (bots) are widely used in many Internet fraudu-
lent activities, especially in the distributed denial of service attacks. Brute force gives enormous power to bot masters and 
makes botnet traffic visible; therefore, some countermeasures might be applied at early stages. Our study focuses on detect-
ing botnet propagation via public websites. The provided algorithm might help with preventing from massive infections when 
popular web sites are compromised without spreading visual changes used for malware in botnets. 
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Introduction  
The number of attacks against information systems has 
been increasing significantly over the last few years, and 
the dynamics of cyber-crime shows a continuous and 
forceful growth. In most significant cases, botnets were 
used as the main tool for committing a crime. The mea-
surements performed at the Communications Regulatory 
Authority of the Republic of Lithuania revealed the fo-
llowing dynamics: in 2008, the total number of unique 
bots in Lithuania was equal to 1 715, in 2009 – to 70 288 












2008 2009 2010  
Fig. 1. Unique bots detected in Lithuania 
Botnets are sophisticated networks organized by as 
many as possible remotely controlled compromised com-
puters affected by malware programs (bots) which usu-
ally are the programs that can have a few or all 
characteristics of computer viruses, trojans and worms 
(Juknius et al. 2009). Hackers are seeking unpatched, unpro-
tected computers, directly targeting the known system flaws  
 
 
or appealing to poorly educated computer users (Christo-
dorescu et al. 2007). Depending on bot type, all known 
malware distribution methods are used with the purpose 
to affect as many working computers on the Internet as 
possible (Schiller et al. 2007). The goal of botnets is to 
use hijacked computers for various fraudulent online 
activities. One of them and most dangerous with its mas-
sive impact, difficult to trace and defeat is distributed 
denial-of-service attack (Ramanauskaite et al. 2010). Due 
to botnet development it has gone evolution from theo-
retical to real informational weapons (Juknius et al. 
2009). Botnets have become effective weapons used for 
targeted computers and informational systems and a sig-
nificant threat even on the whole country scale. Histori-
cally, such attacks were performed for commercial 
reasons; nevertheless, attacks against Estonia and Georgia 
are the examples of obvious warfare in cyberspace with 
capabilities to affect whole countries. The overall archi-
tecture and implementation of botnets is complex and 
evolving toward the use of common software engineering 
techniques, for example modularity (Barford et al. 2005). 
During the last few years, an increased amount of com-
promised websites used for infecting unaware visitors 
with malware for further inclusion into botnets has been 
noticed.  
Botnets with Centralized Command and Controll 
The history of botnets started more than 20 years ago 
when the first bots of IRC (Internet Relay Chat) ap-
peared. At that time, bots were little programs and scripts 
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acting as auxiliaries in online IRC games and channel 
guards. 
The first well known worm PrettyPark emerged to 
make the use of IRC as a means of remote control of the 
affected computers. It was connected to a remote IRC 
(Fig. 2) server and allowed the attacker to retrieve a vari-
ety of information about the system. It also had a basic 
self-update mechanism that permitted downloading and 
executing a file from IRC. Although it is a rather old way 
of employing bots and contra measures are well known, 
the idea of using IRC as the central point of a botnet is 
still vital as such botnets in many cases are still very ef-
fective (Clark et al. 2008). Centralized, usually IRC 
based, botnets are connected to on one or several mir-
rored central servers – Command and Control points 
(C&C). 
 
Fig. 2. A botnet with the centralized command and control point 
After infection and activation, the compromised 
computers attempt connection to specific, predefined 
domains using certain ports. Ports usually used in IRC are 
6667 and 7000. Using the same ports for botnet commu-
nication makes botnet command and control traffic less 
noticeable to gather with legitimate traffic (Lee et al. 
2008). A bot master can connect directly to the chosen 
bot, give instructions to a particular bot or all connected 
bots, manage and reorganize a network until bots are 
connected to this C&C IRC server. Active bots might be 
detected using various network monitoring techniques. 
Continuous network traffic, anomalies or matched signa-
tures might reveal botnet activity (Dunham et al. 2008); 
sometimes it even leads to command and control servers, 
which helps with cutting threat at its roots, thus disabling 
current and preventing possible later attack management 
from the same source. 
From a bot master perspective, the weakest part in 
such botnets is the C&C server. Cutting off the central 
point makes the whole botnet uncontrolled; in most cases 
it means that control over all bots might be lost. 
Peer-to-Peer and HTTP Botnets 
In order to avoid dependence on a single C&C point and 
make botnets more reliable, the creators of botnets started 
implementing Peer-to-Peer (P2P) methods well known in 
file sharing (see Fig. 2). 
 
Fig. 3. Peer-to-Peer botnet architecture 
At an early stage, botnets are organized by sprea-
ding a malicious code and implementing it in as many 
computers (bots) as possible. Usually after implementa-
tion, bots try to connect to the predefined control centers 
or find each other if they are designed to work in the 
Peer-to-Peer mode. At that stage, the affected computers 
try to arrange a controlled network. In many cases, com-
munication traffic between botnets and control centers is 
the weakest link in the whole botnet structure; sometimes 
it is the only evidence that such network exists. A peer-
to-peer approach allows making each affected computer 
C&C and a bot at the same time. Cutting off a single 
member of the network has no big influence on the whole 
botnet.  
The P2P-based botnet is very hard to trace and shut 
down, because the botnet has robust network connec-
tivity, uses encryption and controls traffic dispersion. 
Each bot influences only a small part of the botnet, and 
therefore upgrade / recovery is accomplished easily by its 
botmaster. It might use clique architecture where each 
clique might have its own encryption key. When the bot-
master needs to send information to all nodes, s/he noti-
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fies one member of each cell who then passes on the in-
formation. This creates less traffic than if he broadcasted 
to all bots. Another advantage is that even if traffic is 
being monitored on a certain bot, suspicion is not raised 
if it keeps receiving messages from the same source 
(Porras et al. 2008). In the HTTP based model, to get 
further instructions, bots are connected to the predefined 
HTTP servers seeking for instructions. Using HTTP traf-
fic for bot and C&C communication makes bots almost 
invisible in general Internet traffic and guaranties that the 
user will not block port 80, on which all his http browsing 
relies.  
Nodes in the peer-to-peer network act as both clients 
and servers such that there is no centralized coordination 
point that can be incapacitated. If nodes in the network 
are taken offline, the gaps in the network are closed and 
the network continues to operate under control of the 
botmaster. Another problem posed by P2P botnets to 
security specialists is difficulty in estimating the size of 
the P2P botnet (Dittrich et al. 2008). 
Botnet Propagation via Website Detection Algorithm 
It is important to detect early botnet activities in public 
websites, especially in spreading stage. In cases when a 
popular compromised site is used for malware propaga-
tion, many unaware site visitors can be attacked and be-
come a part of a botnet. Binary checking and methods 
used in various solutions to malware detection (Li et al. 
2007; Juknius et al. 2009; Zhang et al. 2010) often fail to 
identify simple redirection schemes and JavaScript traps. 
While checking the source of the obviously attacked sites, 
we found that the website had no malware itself but acted 
as a redirector to source or performed browser exploita-
tion. When dealing with our algorithm (Fig. 4), we intro-
duce checking not the malware itself rather than the ways 
that might lead to it. 
Although all steps are self explanatory, some additional 
measures using this algorithm might improve results: 
− In many cases we found obvious errors in the 
website code left after malicious code insertions; 
problematic areas can be narrowed using HTML 
standard check. 
− Using such algorithm for a remote site checking 
might be applied periodically, which helps with 
distinguishing anomalies in the web site code. 
− All user agent settings should be adjusted to real 
values. The checker should act as a real user that 
will provoke malicious scripts to act naturally and 
prevent from possible preset contra measures 
against site administrators (local IP, specific re-
ferrers detection). 
− Insertion code, especially complex JavaScript so-
lutions in HTML, varies from site to site; we have 
not found effective way to avoid human inspec-
tion in some cases yet. 
 
Fig. 4. Botnet propagation via website detection 
Conclusions 
1. Early botnet detection in websites might prevent from 
massive problems related to possible infections. 
2. We suggest remote site examining, which helps with 
detecting problems normally hidden from site admin-
istrators.  
3. Automated inspection provides many false positives 
especially in cases with using sophisticated JavaScript 
and dynamic content. 
4. Detection rules should be self-updated, the limited 
amount of the predefined parameters works only 
when dealing with the known problems. 
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BOTNET PLITIMO VIEŠUOSE INTERNETO TINKLUOSE APTIKIMO ALGORITMAS  
J. Juknius, A. Čenys 
Santrauka 
Nagrinėjamas kenksmingo programinio kodo, valdomo paveik-
tų kompiuterių (Botnet) tinklų, susidarymas, plitimas ir jų suku-
riamos grėsmės tinklų ir informacijos saugumui bei 
elektroninėms paslaugoms. Viešų interneto tinklalapių pažei-
džiamumas, nepakankama priežiūra ir administravimo spragos 
sudaro prielaidas jiems tapti didžiausiais kenksmingo programi-
nio kodo platinimo židiniais. Interneto tinklalapiais tolimesnių 
atakų kūrimui piktavaliai sėkmingai naudojasi nuo ankstyvųjų 
Botnet apraiškų, tačiau galimybės tam naudoti aktyviai lanko-
mus, populiarius ir net valstybinio sektoriaus tinklalapius, suku-
ria grėsmes įtakoti pasitikėjimą jais įgavusius asmenis. 
Aprašomas algoritmas ir metodas, įgalinantis aptikti ankstyvą 
Botnet tinklo formavimo stadiją viešuose tinklalapiuose. 
Reikšminiai žodžiai: Botnet, kenksmingas programinis kodas, 
DDoS atakos, tinklų ir informacijos saugumas.  
 
